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Services and establishment were subject to a standstill, and there were limited provisions on Turkish workers. 13 The Association Council had to devise rules on Turkish workers' social security, procurement, non-discriminatory state monopolies, competition and state aid.
14 The EC could continue to operate its anti-dumping laws, 15 and there was a safeguard designed to protect against import surges.
16 Turkey was encouraged to harmonize its laws where necessary for the functioning of the association, and the parties agreed to hold talks on economic and trade policy and abolish discriminatory indirect taxes. 17 Finally, a separate agreement on coal and steel (ECSC products) contained no obligations, but committed the parties to further negotiations.
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C. Developments 1970-1995
The Community and Turkey implemented the Protocol with Association Council Decisions on administrative cooperation and rules of origin for agriculture, further substantive concessions for agriculture, and limited rights for Turkish workers. 19 Yet in 1976, Turkey invoked the safeguard clause to delay any further opening of its market. 20 For its own part, the Community imposed safeguards on Turkish textile and clothing exports in 1977, followed by 'voluntary restraint agreements' that continued until Decision 1/95 entered into force. 21 After a lengthy 'freeze' in the EC-Turkey relationship, Turkey applied to join the EC in 1987, but the EC rejected the application in 1990 and appears unwilling to consider it again. 22 As an alternative to accession, the Commission proposed that the EC and Turkey complete the customs union and (in parallel) resume financial and other cooperation and agree free trade in ECSC products. 23 These parallel issues were settled in 1995, but the results are not yet fully ratified. At the March 1995 Association Council, when Decision 1/95 was agreed, the EC made a unilateral Declaration on resumption of financial aid 24 and the parties adopted a Resolution on development of the association. 25 This Resolution called for an ECSC agreement and new reciprocal agricultural concessions by the end of 1995. It also ex- tended cooperation in a number of areas, suggested closer dialogue on justice and home affairs issues, and established a political dialogue between the parties. At time of writing, the agricultural negotiations were still ongoing and the ECSC-Turkey Free Trade Agreement had come into force recently; however the financial aid package was blocked because of political disputes between Greece and Turkey. In the meantime, the November 1995 Association Council had agreed to a system of regular meetings between the parties, to complement the provisions in Decision 1/95.
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II. Decision 1/95: Substantive Harmonization Requirements
A. Introduction
The new Decision is concerned entirely with the free movement of goods and related issues. It does not even mention free movement of persons or of services, establishment, or capital movements. These issues are still covered by the existing Agreements or Decisions with Turkey.
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A central feature of Decision 1/95 is Turkey's obligation to adopt legislation, to reach agreements, and to apply Treaty articles equivalent to provisions adopted by the EC. This is bolstered by the requirement to interpret any provisions of the Decision worded identically to the EC Treaty in the same way that the Court of Justice has interpreted the EC Treaty?* To ensure the free movement of goods, the parties had to abolish tariffs, quotas, and measures of equivalent effect to either, and also adopt subsidiary provisions on discriminatory taxation and intellectual property law -all of which mirror primary or secondary EC law. To implement the customs union, they had to agree and implement identical customs legislation and commercial policy. To make certain that neither the market nor the customs union became distorted, they had to agree a common competition and state aid rules system and the mechanisms to operate it. Finally, to avoid distortions resulting from divergent amendments to legislation or from divergent judicial interpretation, they had to develop an institutional structure to monitor continued legal integration. 
B. Industrial Goods
Decision 1/95 completes the abolition of all quotas and tariffs on industrial goods between the parties and provides for free circulation, effectively copying Articles 9, 10, 12, 16, 30, 34 and 36 of the EC Treaty. 29 Turkey has five years to adopt EC standards on goods, under a mechanism to be adopted by the Association Council within a year. In the intervening five years, the EC must accept Turkish goods certified to meet EC requirements, and Turkey must accept EC goods made to EC requirements unless it invokes the protection of health, life, and property. 30 The wording of this clause is clear enough to confer direct effect within the EC.
C. Agricultural Goods
The parties must drop all industrial components of the tariffs on processed agriculture, and Turkey is further obliged to harmonise with EC policy: it must adopt the EC's Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) industrial components on processed food imported from third countries. 31 Free movement for other agricultural products will await Turkish adoption of the CAP, which is difficult to envision at present.
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Turkey has one obligation not matched by the EC: it must allow free entry of EC foodstuffs meeting EC standards, in the same manner that it allows industrial goods meeting EC conformity. However, it is not clear whether Turkey must invoke the requisite consultation procedure when it bars such products to protect health and safety. 
D. Common Commercial Policy
Of course, a customs union requires not just abolition of tariffs and quotas between the parties, but a common trade policy. As noted above, Turkey has met its obligations to charge the Common Customs Tariff on industrial goods (except for ECSC products) on an MFN basis from third countries -except for EFTA members, for which it has already adopted the EC's preferential policy. However, full adoption of EC trade policy is deferred for five years. In the meantime, Turkey may still exclude 5% of its 1967 im-. ports from the requirement to charge the Common External Tariff, and must adopt the EC's autonomous tariff preferences and negotiate preferential agreements with third states matching the EC's over this period. 35 This includes the adoption of trade restrictions on textiles and clothing.
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Along with the requirement to conclude equivalent agreements, Turkey also has to apply identical trade defence and customs legislation to that of the EC. 37 The parties are encouraged to adopt joint trade defence actions, but are not compelled to do so.
38 Although the 1970 Protocol specified that the parties would reach agreement on a system for harmonizing commercial policy, 39 the Decision contains no such provision. Its institutions deal solely with cooperation on EC legislation.
E. Possible Abolition of Trade Defences
Turkey is given a further incentive to adopt EC legislation: the EC might drop antidumping, anti-subsidy, and 'trade barrier' actions against Turkey, 'provided that Turkey has implemented competition, state aids control and other relevant parts of the acquis communautaire which are related to the internal market '. 40 This was the quid pro quo of abolition of trade defence measures under the EEA, 41 although unfortunately the Decision provides only for a review of trade defence actions, rather than automatic suspension once the Association Council determines that the conditions are met.
F. Intellectual Property
Turkey is obliged to adopt a detailed list of EC legislation and international conventions on intellectual property rights (IPRs) and implement most rules of the TRIPs (Trade- 
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Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement within three years. 42 The Annex explicitly provides that it will not affect national rules on exhaustion of EPRs -a derogation from the requirement that the Decision must be interpreted in the same way as the EC Treaty.
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G. Competition and State Aid
like many of the EC's other trading partners, Turkey is obliged to adopt the EC's competition and state aid rules. The EC now has three separate systems for 'external' application of these rules, each dealing differently with five central questions: (i) which law is to be followed (always the EC's, although possibly with exceptions or transitional derogations); (ii) which authority has jurisdiction; (iii) how the policy and legislation is to be enforced; (iv) how application of the law and policy are to remain consistent; and (v) how disputes over consistency, jurisdiction, interpretation or enforcement must be settled.
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The EEA adopted EC competition and state aids law without derogation (except for the exclusion of basic agriculture and fisheries products), including all legislation, Decisions, block exemptions, state aid frameworks and guidelines, and prior case law. It precludes parallel jurisdiction over competition law by adopting combined percentage of activity and de minimis tests to ascertain which authority should deal with a case. 45 An EFTA Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court were established, with powers over competition and state aid that match the EC Commission and Courts' powers.
The Europe Agreements (and now the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Tunisia and Morocco) 46 state that restrictive practices, abuses of dominant positions, and distortions caused by state aid are 'incompatible' with the proper functioning of the Agreements to the extent that they affect trade.
47 Such practices will be 'assessed on the basis of criteria arising from application of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92' EC, and the parties must inform each odier of state aids they are granting. The associates were thus initially not explicitly required to adopt EC legislation, case law, and policy, al- though (as discussed in Section 3.4, infra) they risked a trade defence measure if they did not.
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Each Association Council has three years to adopt implementing rules (and to ensure that the 'principles' of Article 90 EC are upheld), and in the meantime each party will apply the GATT Subsidies Code to assess state aid granted by the other. Yet simultaneously, aid granted by associates must be 'assessed' (for five years, capable of renewal) as if the associates were underdeveloped areas within the meaning of Article 92(3)(a) EC. Since the GATT Subsidies Code is quite differently structured from Article 92 EC, this might give rise to problems of interpretation.
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The Association Councils have now agreed virtually identical implementing rules under five of the Europe Agreements, although the rules leave many issues unresolved. 50 The rules also ignore state aids 51 and public undertakings, and provide for overlapping competence of the Commission and the associates' national authorities in competition cases, albeit with the possibility of requesting the other authority to take action and a right of each associate's authority to comment when affected by operation of the EC's Merger Regulation. They also establish that the EC's block exemptions must be applied in each of the associates, which was only implicit in the parent Agreements. In the long term, the Commission believes that a variant of the EFTA Surveillance Authority might possibly be established in Eastern Europe, but such a development seems some time away. For the time being, it would like the associates' national 'surveillance authorities' to assess state aids pursuant to the EC's rules and procedures.
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In contrast, Turkey's harmonization obligations are far more explicit. 53 Before entry into force of the Decision, it had to establish a competition law implementing Arts. 85 and 86 EC, and adapt textile aids to the EC state aids rules. It has a year to adopt EC block exemption regulations and the principles of Article 90 EC (including secondary legislation and case law). Finally, Turkey has two years to apply EC state aid rules to the remainder of its industry. 
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Under the 1970 Protocol, Turkey had been classed as a 'developing area' under Article 92(3)(a) EC. Aid was considered automatically compatible with the Association if it did not 'alter the conditions of trade to an extent inconsistent with the mutual interests' of the parties. 55 This did not stop the EC from implementing an anti-subsidy action against Turkish exports, when the Commission and Council believed that trade was indeed so altered.
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Decision 1/95 has amended implementation of the EC Treaty's state aid rules to allow for a partial continuation of the previous derogation. First of all, aid to Turkey's less developed regions (rather than all of Turkey) is still automatically compatible with the customs union (in the sense of Article 92(2) EC), albeit for only a five year period which cannot be renewed and only to the extent that this does not 'adversely affect trading conditions between the Community and Turkey' contrary to the common interest 57 Secondly, aid may be granted (in the sense of Article 92(3) EC) to promote development of poor areas of the customs union indefinitely and to assist in Turkey's structural adjustment for five years (which may be extended). 58 The latter clause is unique to the Decision, but the former clause incorporates Article 92(3)(a) EC again, albeit now without automatically approving all such aid (bar that affecting trade) or specifying that all of Turkey is considered poor relative to the EC. However, Article 92(3)(a) EC refers to areas which are poor relative to the EC average, 59 rather than a Member State average, a definition which would still allow aid to be granted to all of Turkey for the foreseeable future. Poorer parts of Member States (and thus of Turkey) can still receive aid under Article 92(3)(c) EC, also incorporated into the Decision.
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The implementing rules should be adopted within two years, but in the meantime each competition authority shall deal separately with disputes that affect both parties and state aids should be assessed in light of the GATT Subsidies Code -although the dispute settlement rules for state aids might have already settled the issue. Each party may request the other to review anti-competitive activities undertaken on its territory. There are also general information and consultation obligations. Decision 1/95 aims for a more intense level of integration than do the Europe Agreements (to date) but there are several problems with both the design of future harmonization and the method of dispute settlement (discussed infra, Sections in. C and D). 
ID. Institutional Issues
Although the Decision provides access to the EC's customs union, rather than its internal market, the EC and Turkey faced the same four institutional issues that the EC and the EFTA states tried to solve in the EEA: consultation, decision-making, homogeneity, and dispute settlement 61 Logically enough, the EEA has served as a model for the customs union, but with some modifications likely to detract from the effectiveness of the new agreement Some of the most critical issues are not covered at all. In short, the Decision falls short of the institutional development that a customs union requires.
A. Institutional Structure
The customs union will be overseen by a new institution, the Customs Union Joint Committee (CUJC), identical in certain respects to the EEA Joint Committee.
62 Like the latter Committee, the CUJC will consist of members of the Contracting Parties, and will meet once a month as a general rule, indicating that the parties realize that the customs union will require close coordination and frequent contact to maintain. 63 It will consist of national representatives (presumably senior civil servants) and may establish sub-committees or working parties. Unlike the EEA Joint Committee, the CUJC is not empowered 'to take decisions in the cases provided for', but may only 'formulate recommendations to the Association Council and deliver opinions' to ensure the functioning of the customs union.
There are, however, four limited exceptions to this in the Decision: the Committee may grant a delay if Turkey is unable to adopt changes to the EC's Common Customs Tariff immediately; 64 it must establish a list of goods from the EC's FTA partners upon which Turkey may charge a compensatory levy pending its adoption of parallel preferential agreements; 63 it may amend or abolish a 'divergent implementation safeguard' adopted by either party; 66 and it must perform any IPR-related tasks assigned to it by the Association Council. 67 Outside these four fields and its general responsibility to oversee the functioning of the agreement, the Committee is to serve as a forum for consultation in certain specified cases. 68 The powers which the Association Council retains from the 1970 Protocol are partly in fields unrelated to the customs union. They cover the implementation of free movement of workers, services (including transport) and establishment; 79 the approval of restrictions on capital transfer, 80 and a wide array of review, consultation and recommendation functions. 81 The Association Council also retains powers over dispute settlement and expansion of the scope of the association under the Ankara Agreement.
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All other powers have apparently (but not explicitly) been subsumed by the provisions of the Decision.
B. Consultation and Decision-making
The customs union's consultation mechanisms have been taken in large part from the EEA. 83 The Decision begins by listing the areas which are of 'direct relevance' to the customs union and which Turkey must therefore harmonize with: commercial policy; commercial agreements with third countries; legislation on technical barriers, intellectual property, customs and competition. 84 When directly relevant new legislation is drawn up by the Community, 85 it must consult Turkish experts informally, send copies of the formal proposals to Turkey, and hold regular consultations in the CUJC during the Community's decision-making procedure.
86 Turkish experts must also be consulted when draft Commission regulations are laid before executive Committees or subsequently referred to the Council. 87 When legislation is finally adopted, the Community must inform Turkey to allow it to adopt corresponding legislation.
88 Turkey retains the Living in Sin: Legal Integration Under the EC-Turkey Customs Union right to amend its own legislation, subject to consultations in the CUJC to ensure that the amendments will not interfere with the customs union.
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If consultations on either of these tracks fail, the parties depart somewhat from the EEA procedure. 90 The CUJC may recommend methods of avoiding injury, while the EEA Joint Committee may take actions to maintain functioning of the agreement. If the discrepancies in legislation nevertheless result in 'impairment of the free movement of goods, deflections of trade, or economic problems' (under the customs union), or a failure to amend an Annex (under the EEA), a party may protect itself with a special form of safeguard.
91 There is also a special requirement to consult in the CUJC before Turkey invokes the equivalent of Article 36 EC.
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The EEA's decision-making provisions were widely criticized as inadequate when the Agreement was concluded; They were clearly designed to allow the EC full freedom to adopt legislation as it wished, while involving the EFTA states only in non-binding discussions and subsequent approval of the final product. It seems that the EC is willing to consult with non-Member States in certain circumstances, but is unwilling to give any non-members full access to its decision-making procedures. The flaws in the EEA provisions have been compounded by the failure to adjust them to reflect Turkey's involvement in the EC's trade policy. Turkey cannot affect the revision or negotiation of new trade agreements, and it is explicitly excluded from consultation when the EC adopts trade policy measures against third states -even though the Decision suggests that the EC and Turkey should attempt to act in tandem on such measures.
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The consultation structure of Decision 1/95 is supplemented by an agreed system of EC-Turkey meetings that is apparently based on the EC's integration program with Eastern Europe, rather than the EEA. 94 The March 1995 Association Council agreed on the modalities of implementing 'political dialogue' between the parties. There will be an annual summit between the Turkish President or Prime Minister and the Commission and European Council President; half-yearly meetings of Foreign Ministers (once in the Association Council and once as a Troika); meetings of senior officials twice a year, consultation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) working parties; and regular information on the results of CFSP meetings.
The November 1995 Association Council agreed a similar consultation system for first and third pillar matters. In addition to the summit meetings and meetings with Foreign Ministers, Turkish ministers were granted meetings twice a year with Internal Market Ministers; (unspecified) ministerial meetings in other customs union areas; and 'regular' meetings with Home Affairs Ministers and the 'K.4 Committee' of senior officials preparing Home Affairs discussions. Senior officials in relevant sectors will also meet regularly. These arrangements fall far short of the dozens of yearly meetings now held with the eastern associates. Twice-yearly meetings with Foreign Ministers are obviously insufficient to coordinate commercial policy, although Turkish ministers may have a greater impact in internal market meetings, which are held only four times a year. There is no agenda for the Home Affairs meetings yet, and no indication that there are plans to negotiate parallel Conventions to those agreed by the Union's Member States.
C. Homogeneity
Although the EC and Turkey adapted the EEA system for incorporating new legislation, they decided to truncate the EEA model for incorporating case law. As noted supra. Decision 1/95 contains a provision requiring identical interpretation of identical provisions of the EC Treaty.
95 This was obviously inspired by the EEA clause requiring identical interpretation of all Treaty articles and of all legislation mentioned in the Annexes and adopted prior to the date of signature. 96 The two obligations clearly differ substantially. Although Decision 1/95 does not list the bulk of EC legislation in massive sectoral Annexes, it does list customs, trade policy and intellectual property laws which Turkey must adopt 97 Furthermore, it obliges Turkey to adopt the EC's secondary competition and state aid legislation (including the EC's competition block exemptions and the case law developed by EC authorities) as well as the principles of the secondary legislation and case law resulting from Article 90 EC. 98 It is hard to see how these obligations can function without a method of incorporating the case law (past and future) relating to such secondary legislation.
The other part of the EEA model is omitted entirely. As the EFTA states were unwilling to commit to incorporate all future case law of the ECJ, the EEA established a 'homogeneity procedure' under which the EC and the EFTA states examine the rulings of both the ECJ and the EFTA Court (which receives references from the courts of the EFTA states on interpretation of the EEA).
99 If the Courts' interpretations of legislation or the EC Treaty begin to diverge, the Joint Committee is to act 'to preserve the homogeneous interpretation of the Agreement', failing which the dispute settlement procedure is to be invoked. This procedure is bolstered by a system of exchanging information on EC law among the relevant courts, and the rights of intervention for all parties Living in Sin: Legal Integration Under the EC-Turkey Customs Union before the EFTA Court or the ECJ. 10° Even though Turkey has only committed itself to accept the case law relating to the EC Treaty, and it is apparently willing to accept the future case law of the ECJ on the Treaty, it is surely possible that the Turkish courts will begin to deliver divergent interpretations of Treaty articles, which might well distort the free movement of goods between the parties. It should also be possible for Turkey to express its view on relevant cases before the ECJ when its courts have an obligation to accept the ruling; or for the Commission's legal advisors to advise the Turkish courts on the ECJ's jurisprudence. Yet there is no mechanism to transmit judgments of each party's courts, for mutual intervention, or for the parties to act to preserve homogeneous interpretation of the agreement. The Community and Turkey have willed the end without providing the means.
D. Dispute Settlement and Safeguards
Like the consultation provisions, the parties have used an EEA model for dispute settlement. 101 The EEA allows the parties to bring a dispute on the interpretation or application of the EEA before the EEA Joint Committee. If the dispute involves a provision identical to one in the EC Treaty or secondary legislation (including a dispute over divergent case law), the parties may refer it to the ECJ for interpretation after three months of consultations.
102 After six months, if the dispute is neither referred to die ECJ nor settled, the parties can eidier apply the procedure for suspending an Annex to the EEA or take a safeguard measure. Safeguards can also be imposed when 'serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature' arise. They must be proportionate and are subject to consultations before and after adoption with a view to avoiding them or ending them as soon as possible. When one party invokes a safeguard, the other may take a 'proportionate' balancing measure, again subject to consultations.
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In the event of a dispute between the EC Commission's and the EFTA Surveillance Authority's interpretation of state aid legislation, a party may adopt 'interim measures' (after two weeks' consultation), which could become definitive if the dispute could not be settled in continuing negotiations.
104 A party can also invoke arbitration without the power that might distinguish them from the impugned EEA Court is that their decision will only have explicit legal effect in Turkey; they will not be interpreting EC law to be applied in the territory of the EC. However, since the arbitrators' decision will likely have effects upon trade between the EC and Turkey, the Court of Justice might nonetheless be reluctant to uphold their powers.'
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If arbitration on state aids can clear these two hurdles, then the procedure could have substantial practical effects. It could protect Turkey from any unjustified assault upon state aids it grants to industry in line with EC law. This would represent de facto application of the ERA's bar on anti-subsidy actions between the parties, 121 which could in any event be rescinded (with no recourse to arbitration) if a dispute over application of state aid rules could not be settled. Turkey appears to have been granted a right available to no other EC trading partners.
Apart from the distinct rules for state aids, both dispute settlement mechanisms share one central weakness. There seems no reason why arbitration should not be available to settle any issue of interpretation or application (bar interpretation of EC law), as it is with most other EC trade agreements. The GATT dispute settlement system (now upgraded and applied to all agreements overseen by the WTO) does not exclude any aspect of a WTO Member's obligations from arbitration. It seems highly questionable that an agreement concluded pursuant to GATT Article XXTV (allowing customs unions and free trade areas) should contain dispute settlement provisions weaker than those available to GATT parties.
On the same note, the safeguard mechanism is less liberal than the new GATT Safeguards Code -which sets a limit for expiry of the safeguard and requires liberalization of the measure in the meantime. At least the Decision shares this flaw with every other EC trade agreement; the EC and Turkey also missed the chance to upgrade the safeguard procedure to that of the EEA, requiring extended consultation before and after the measure is adopted. Given the previous extensive use of safeguards by both parties, this suggests a regrettable lack of desire to minimize future disruptions.
IV. Conclusions
Before their relationship becomes any more complicated, it would be best for the Community and Turkey to consolidate all of the 'constitutional' documents of the association into one agreement It is not clear to the layman what the parties have agreed upon and which provisions are still in operation until one has researched the association at length. Perhaps the institutional complexity, proliferation of transitional provisions, and main-120 Although the Decision has not been referred to the ECJ for an opinion on its compatibility with the EC Treaty, a Member State or affected company might test the validity of this clause by requesting the Commission to begin an anti-subsidy investigation against an aid cleared by the arbitrators. The Commission's refusal could be subject to an annulment action on the grounds that the arbitrators had no competence to make their determination. 121 AH.26EEA. a yawning gap between the Turkish and European Courts' analysis of legislation. It makes massive expectations of Turkey without allowing for any genuine role in decision-making. Its dispute settlement clauses are insufficient -bar the arbitration procedure for reviewing state aids, which is opaquely drafted and may breach the ECJ's prohibition on 'outsiders' interpreting EC law. The EC's desire to bolster the pro-European forces in Turkey is laudable, and the resumption of 'normal' EC-Turkey relations is welcome, provided that the Community Continues to use its leverage to press for improvements in the Turkish human rights record. Yet the Decision does not provide all the tools necessary to ensure full legal integration, and without such integration, the customs union will not really be complete. In any event, there is bound to be a limit to Turkish leaders' willingness to stand with their noses pressed up against the glass as the EC institutions make decisions affecting their country's fate.
